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ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER: A TECHNOLOGY
IN SEARCH OF A MARKET
PETER

H.

SCHUCK*

Many of the nation's bankers, businessmen, and banking regulators have a grand vision of the consumer's future. Just over the
horizon, they fervently hope, is the cashless, paperless society, made
possible by a massive electronic web linking retail establishments,
employer payroll departments, government agencies, financial institutions, and other instrumentalities of payment and receipt. Fund transfers will move throughout this web more or less instantaneously and
invisibly. Plastic will replace cash, electronic impulses will supplant
paper, and all parties involved - consumers, merchants, bankers, regulators, and employers - will reap the advantages of this efficient,
streamlined system. Electronic funds transfer (EFT) will be the
classic case of a Pareto optimal solution .to a problem - everyone can
be made better off without anyone 'being made worse off.
This, at any rate, is the vision. But like most visions, the enthusiasm of the visionary conspires with the pristine purity of the
abstract goals to produce a rather limited image of the world to come.
This image tends to neglect those portions of reality which mar the
vision. And when the vision is ultimately reified and made flesh, the
persistent realities doggedly assert themselves, often in unpleasant and
anti-social ways.
Consider, for example, the seat belt buzzer and interlock systems
mandated by federal law at considerable expense to consumers. The
vision that launched that technology, of course, was of a vast reduction
in the number of deaths and serious injuries from automobile accidents. The zeal of the visionaries was fueled by the demonstrable
ability of seat belts to prevent casualties and the very real social benefits that such prevention would produce. What they evidently failed
to take into account, however, was that many drivers would not perceive the new technology as a benefit (despite mountains of data to
the contrary) or would regard the benefit as outweighed by the cost,
and would simply refuse to use the seat belts. And, despite truly
* B.A., Cornell, 1962; J.D., Harvard, 1965; L.L.M., New York University,
1966; M.A., Harvard, 1969. Director, Washington Office of Consumers Union. The
author's views are entirely his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of
Consumers Union. This article is based on a speech, "EFT and the Consumer,"
presented by Mr. Schuck at a conference sponsored by The Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston. The Maryland Law Review gratefully acknowledges the Bank's permission
to include this material in this Symposium.

19751

EFT

-

IN SEARCH OF

A MARKET

imaginative efforts on the part of the government to render non-use
extremely difficult, that is precisely what has happened.'
The point of the seat belt example, of course, is not that it was
a mistake to mandate these systems (though a cost-benefit analysis
of this reform might well indicate that), but that an important piece
of information, bearing directly on the issue of the social cost-effectiveness of the technology, was lost somewhere between the vision
and the fact. And -that stubborn bit of reality haunts the technology
today, showing no signs of receding before the tide of well-intentioned
reform. The wasted expense to those consumers who were obliged to
purchase the systems, only to ignore or disconnect them, is a price
of ignoring that reality.
Every commercial technology creates social costs just as surely as
it generates efficiencies and other economic benefits. The automobile, for
all of its virtues, has permanently disfigured the physical structure of our
communities -and distorted the social structure of our society. It has
caused massive air pollution, taken millions of lives, and has probably
contributed substantially to the degraded physical vigor of the population. These and other costs associated with automobile technology
are, in the aggregate, very great indeed, and few of them were foreseen either by the promoters of the automobile or by its consumers.
Had they been foreseen, -the technology might have taken a radically
different form, or alternatives to the automobile might have been
preserved and developed, or both. In their, roles as taxpayers, consumers, and voters, a more clairvoyant American people might well
have insisted upon controlling and humanizing the automobile before
the technology had become economically, politically, and socially institutionalized - in short, before it became too late.
EFT is not the automobile, of course, and an analogy between
them cannot be pressed too far. In many ways, however, the case for
asking the hard questions about EFT now rather than later, and for inposing such restrictions upon EFT as are necessary to make it acceptable to consumers, is far more compelling -than with respect to the
automobile at the comparable stage of its development. Perhaps the
most important single factor distinguishing EFT from the automobile
and from other "inevitable technologies" is one that is rarely mentioned:
significant consumer demand for any extensive EFT system or, indeed,
for any change in the present paper transfer system, apparently, does
not exist. Indeed, consumers appear to be actively hostile to the institution of such systems.
1. Robertson and Haddon, The Buzzer-Light Reminder System and Safety Belt

Use, 64 Am. J.

PuB. HEALTHa

814 (1974).
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The evidence for this proposition is, in a word, overwhelming.
In 1970, a study conducted for the American Bankers Association
to measure consumer, business, and banker attitudes toward EFT
concluded:
The fact that consumers do not regard checks as inconvenient
leads to the finding that a revised payments system holds no benefits from the consumer's point of view.
However, our findings go further. They show not only that
the consumer sees nothing to be gained from a switch to electronic
funds transfer. They show that the consumer will feel a definite
loss.2

Consumer attitudes do not appear to have changed materially since
1970. Just two years ago, another study sponsored by the American
Bankers Association yielded similar findings.8 Significantly, this study
excluded from its ambit all EFT systems except "direct pay deposit"

(i.e., automatic payroll deposit) and "prearranged transfers" (i.e.,
transfers between a consumer's accounts in a single bank). Thus, the
study not only excluded retail point of sale transfers but also excluded
preauthorized payments between consumers and businesses, even payments which were fixed, periodic, and substantial, such as insurance
premiums. In short, the EFT systems under consideration were exceedingly limited: they did not include any of those systems which
would dramatically transform consumer styles of payment and receipt,
which are thought to -constitute the core of a mature EFT system.
Nevertheless, consumer opposition to even these limited EFT
systems was evident. In the case of "direct pay deposit," the employees
who favored 'this system apparently did so not because it reduced their
utilization of checks, but primarily because it increased checking. The
study notes:
Where provided, free checking is clearly perceived as the
major advantage by respondents. This is particularly true for
those workers who ; may have been considering a checking account
but have delayed the decision because of cost factors.
For some employees, particularly blue-collar and lower echelon workers, direct-pay deposit provides an initiation into the use
2.
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[hereinafter cited as 1970 ABA Study].

3. BOoz-ALLEN & HAMILTON AND NATIONAL ANALYSTS, MARKETING UPDATE:
INSIGHTS INTO Two PAYMENTS SYSTEMS PRODUCTS (October, 1973) (a study conducted for the American Banceris Association) [hereinafter cited as 1973 ABA Study].
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of a checking account. For these workers, the system comes to be
desired because of the advantages inherent in the use of a checking account. Convenience in paying bills is quickly discerned.
It is ironic, to say the least, that a technology justified chiefly on
the ground that it will end or reduce the necessity for paper, turns
out to be valued by consumers precisely because, and to the extent
that, it actually increases checking.5
Consumer hostility to prearranged transfers, even the very limited
ones involved in the study, was also evident. The study noted that
consumer acceptance of this system declined as one moved from automatic saving plans to prearranged payment of large, fixed payment
bills for major expenditures (such as mortgages and auto loans) to
prearranged payment of revolving credit and other bills which vary
in amount.' Although the study does not indicate just how favorable
or unfavorable consumer attitudes toward these systems were (the
rankings were only comparative), it did characterize consumer views
toward transfers or variable payments:
Payment of revolving credit and other bills which vary monthly
in amount is seen as neither particularly convenient nor in the
consumer's self-interest. Indeed, it is generally viewed by consumers as limiting their ability to manipulate their own finances,
to make discretionary expenditures, or to exert leverage in cases
where they wish better service from a creditor. Restriction of
these options is 7viewed as limiting the customer's ability to 'control his money'.
Again, it is important to stress that these attitudes were elicited in a
study that did not even include those payments the electronic transfers
of which are generally believed to arouse the most hostility on the part
of consumers - point of sale payments to non-bank sellers of goods
and services.
A third, very recent study of consumer attitudes toward EFT
has produced similar findings. Commissioned by the Special Committee on Paperless Entries (SCOPE committee) of the Virginia
Bankers Association and published in June 1974, the study concluded:
The most important attitudinal aspect of the present bill paying
system is that customers are very satisfied with it. Eighty-two
percent of customers strongly agree that they like the all-around
4. Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
5. Other advantages, as well as many disadvantages, of the "direct pay deposit"
system were perceived by users, of course, but those who favored the system on balance
apparently did so because it enhanced their access to checking. Id. at 37-38.
6. Id. at 50.
7. Id. at 50-51.
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convenience of a checking account. This strong favorability toward checking accounts increases among those customers who
are heaviest users of checks - the better educated and higher
income families. Nearly eight customers in ten disagree with the
statement, 'It is difficult to keep my balance correct in my checking account.' This contrasts with attitudes toward the statement,
'Using a credit card makes paying bills much easier.' Only a slim
majority (53 percent) agree with this statement, compared with
the 94 percent who agree (either 'strongly' or 'somewhat') on
the all-around convenience of a checking account. 8
Consumers, it would appear, are not alone in harboring grave
doubts concerning EFT. The 1970 ABA study discussed above indicated that neither the bankers nor the businessmen surveyed perceived
EFT to be of particular benefit to them. Bankers, the study concluded,
believed that implementation of EFT systems would entail substantial
outlays without corresponding economic benefits. Checking accounts
were seen as profitable banking services and the resulting paperwork,
while worrisome, remained well within the banks' processing capacity.
More rapid payment systems might be more "efficient," but they would
also reduce, and perhaps wholly eliminate, much of the "float" which
is so profitable to the banker. Unless the bank's depositors were predominantly corporate payees, whose accounts would receive more rapid
in-flows than before, this feature might prove to be exceedingly costly.
The 1973 ABA study noted that banks had not even vigorously promoted in-bank prearranged transfers.' Their enthusiasm for prearranged transfers to third parties, one can safely assume, would be
considerably less robust due to the negative float implications to the
banks in many or most such cases.
Business attitudes were rather similar. The costly changes in
corporate payment processing and computer systems which EFT
would entail were perceived as the principal disadvantage of the technology.10 Elimination of float would be financially attractive to many
businesses,' to be sure, but EFT would not necessarily accomplish
that. The study found:
As businessmen see it, the obstacle to quick payment is not the
banking system. It is the amount of time the payer takes before
8. Virginia's EFTS Study, THE SOUTHERN BANKER, Aug., 1974, at 38, 39
(containing excerpts from VIRGINIA CONSUMER ATTITUDES TowARD PAYMENT SYSTEMS, a study conducted by Opinion Research Corporation for the Virginia Bankers
Association, June, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Virginia Study].
9. 1973 ABA Study, supra note 3, at 48.
10. This objection was also noted in the 1973 ABA Study. Id. at 34-35.

11. Direct pay deposit, of course, reduces the employer's float, a factor which
inclines many, though not all, companies to reject DPD. See id. at 33-34.
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he decides to send the money. Compared to this 'decision time',
the day or two of float is insignificant. 2
And while pre-authorized debiting would eliminate the payer's decision
time, businessmen felt that neither consumers nor business customers
would acquiesce in pre-authorized debiting.13 A period for payment,
like a tax deduction, is an advantage not lightly relinquished once it
is enjoyed.
Lest it appear that consumer disquiet concerning EFT simply
reflects a Luddite mentality - a phenomenon that credit card companies and manufacturers of microwave ovens and fast foods have not
discerned - it is well to touch upon the various benefits and costs
to consumers of EFT. For obvious reasons, no effort is made to
quantify these benefits and costs. The data required to do so not only
does not exist, but in the nature of things can never exist. Moreover,
the intensity of feelings about particular features of EFT will vary
considerably from consumer to consumer. Indeed, what some will consider a benefit (for example, the convenience of not having to write
checks) others will regard as a cost (loss of the sense of control derived
from the act of check-writing).
Finally, one's evaluation of EFT will depend critically upon what
kind of system one is considering, for the range of possibilities is
broad and the difference between direct pay deposit, on the one hand,
and point-of-sale EFT, on the other, is very great.
Nevertheless, when one canvasses the features of EFT from the
"average" consumer's point of view, the opposition to it no longer
seems very mysterious; rather, it appears to be rooted in the most
hard-headed rational considerations of homo economicus.
BENEFITS OF

EFT

Postage and Mailing Costs - To the extent that EFT obviated the
necessity for purchases of stamps and envelopes, an out-of-pocket cost
to the consumer would be eliminated. Many banks, however, already
provide pre-addressed, postage-free envelopes for deposits, withdrawals,
and loan repayments by mail. Many commercial creditors do likewise.
The costs of doing so, of course, are probably passed on to the consumer indirectly through increased prices for the product or service
for which payment is made.
Convenience - With the advent of credit cards, banking-by-mail
and card-actuated cash terminals, this virtue of convenience of EFT
12. 1970 ABA Study, supra note 2, at 18.
13. Id. at 19.
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assumes somewhat diminished significance, but it remains a clear
benefit. The magnitude of the benefit will depend to a considerable
extent upon the value that the consumer places on his or her time.
For example, the Virginia study found that higher income consumers,
being particularly mindful of the time consumed in paying bills, tended
to stress this advantage. 4 Similarly, the aged and the infirm will tend
to value the physical energy consumed in going to and from the bank
or to cash facilities.
Verification of the consumer's identity and authenticity is apparently simpler under an EFT system than when a check is written. On
the other hand, consumers who use EFT through point-of-sale terminals may find that the transaction requires somewhat more time than
simply cashing a check. 5 On balance, as Governor Mitchell of the
Federal Reserve Board has concluded, "convenience ... has generated

little spontaneous enthusiasm thus far." 16
Personal Security - It is likely that a widespread EFT system
would, by reducing the necessity to carry cash, lower the incidence of
robbery and, therefore, of violence to the person. Similarly, forgery
of checks would become a historical curiosity. However, the incentives
for crimes against 'the system as a whole through unauthorized access
to the computer program or unauthorized use of a consumer's card, are
enormously enhanced, as discussed below.
Interest on Demand Accounts - While existing law prohibits financial
institutions from paying interest on demand deposits, 1 7 the thrift institutions have managed to provide the near-equivalent of an interestbearing demand account on a limited scale. In addition to the negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) account operative in Massachusetts
and New Hampshire, the First Federal Savings & Loan of Lincoln,
Nebraska, has installed an EFT system with point-of-sale terminals in
certain supermarkets and the mutual savings banks have created a
Mutual Institutions National Transfer System (MINTS) to promote
their participation in EFT development. The reason is clear: linking
EFT to their interest-bearing time depositary accounts would confer an
enormous competitive advantage on the thrifts over the commercial
14. Virginia Study, supra note 8, at 40.
15. See An S&L Puts the Teller in the Supermarket, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 20, 1974,
at 88, 91, describing the operational EFT system in Lincoln, Nebraska.
16. Address by George W. Mitchell, Recent Developments in Money Transfers,
EFTS symposium of the Atlanta Committee on Paperless Entries, Feb. 26, 1973, at 6.
17. The argument is often made, of course, that by providing funds transfer
services, often at little or no cost, commercial banks are in fact paying depositors
interest on their balances.
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banks, for it would permit the thrifts to pay a premium interest rate
(now five and three-fourths percent) on an account that would possess
the transferability characteristics of a checking account. The legality
of this innovation is presently before the courts on precisely this ground,
among others.' s If upheld, Congress will be under considerable pressure to restore the competitive equilibrium either by limiting the power
of the thrifts or by permitting the commercial banks to pay interest on
demand deposits.'" If the latter, consumers will benefit greatly.
COSTS OF

EFT

Control Over PersonalFinances - A major disadvantage associated
with EFT is the consumer's loss of control over certain financial decisions. The ability to manipulate one's finances within broad limits,
to determine which bills to pay when, and to exploit the benefits of
float during the check-clearing process, are not only incidents of personal autonomy but can be of great economic value to the consumer.
Which of us has not practiced the art of "playing the float"? Of
overdrawing on our account secure in the knowledge that the check
that we deposit will clear before our own checks are presented for
payment? Of holding off our creditors until our paycheck can be
deposited? Of obtaining additional time for payment by post-dating
our check? Indeed, it is probably no exaggeration to state that a
substantial portion of the population manages to make ends meet only
by resort to such fancy financial footwork. An EFT system based upon
prearranged transfers completely deprives consumers of this kind of
control; any EFT system, however, even one not involving prearranged
transfers, will greatly diminish it.
To those who argue - with considerable justification - that
such stratagems by consumers simply exploit an inefficient clearing
process and impose unnecessary costs on the system as a whole, consumers can respond that while this may be true, they will not willingly,
and could not rationally, relinquish such an advantage in the interests
of the system as a whole, at least not unless they receive equivalent
benefits in return.
18. See, e.g., Bloomfield Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. American Community Stores
Corp., Civil Action No. 74-0-146 (D. Neb., June 11, 1975).
19. Both of these changes would be contrary to current legislative trends. The
proposed Financial Institutions Act, an outgrowth of the recommendations of the
Hunt Commission report, would retain the existing prohibition against the payment
of interest on demand deposits, but would expand the powers of the thrifts. See
generally THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE &
REGULATION (1971).
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Proof of Payment - The cancelled check is a convenient and universally recognized proof of payment. It is widely used in the prepara-

tion of tax returns, the informal resolution of disputes, in formal legal
proceedings, and in triggering a depositor's legal duty to detect forgeries or alterations and report them to the bank so that the bank's
20
duty not to pay unauthorized items can attach.
Indeed, so essential to consumer remedies is the cancelled check
as proof of payment that any EFT system that hopes to gain consumer
acceptance will have to invent some substitute for it. In a recent study,
fully ninety-four percent of the consumers surveyed agreed that a cancelled check was the most reliable proof of payment. 21 Computer data
certainly is no adequate substitute. Considerable doubts concerning
its admissibility into evidence remain,22 and such data is not easily
accessable to consumers.
Stopping Payment - The right of consumers to direct a stop payment
order to a bank2 3 gives them enormous leverage in their dealings with
merchants, landlords, and others with whom they do business, leverage
that is often necessary to ensure that the consumer's legal rights are
in fact protected. Abrogation of this right would fundamentally transform the economic bargaining power of consumers. If anything, the
trend in consumer protection is in the opposite direction, as evidenced
by the Federal Trade Commission's Trade Regulation Rule requiring
a "cooling off period" for certain types of door-to-door sales transac24
tions, within which the consumer may rescind the transaction.
Any acceptable EFT system will have to accommodate this wellestablished safeguard for consumers. The California SCOPE guidelines confirmed it by requiring a depositor's bank to recredit a
previous debit entry upon notification by the depositor that the debit
was in error, so long as certain time limitations are observed.2 5 These
protections would have to be greatly strengthened in an EFT system
which, unlike the original California SCOPE project, was not limited to
prearranged transfers (which are far less likely to give rise to errors
than on-line transfers effected at the point-of-sale).
20. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 4-401 and 4-406.
21. Virginia Study, supra note 8, at 39.
22. See Survey, Toward a Less-Check Society, 47 NOTRE

DAME LAW.

1163,

1265-83 (1972).
23. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§

4-403.

24. 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (1974).
25. Los ANGELES AND SAN FRANCISCO CLEARING HOUSE AsSOCIATIONS, SCOPE
PROCEDURAL GUIDE 37-38 (1972).
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Security Against Theft or Error - We are only beginning to recognize the vastly increased potential for theft of depositors' funds through
misuse of an EFT system. Computer crime is facilitated by a number
of unique features: the anonymity and remoteness of the thief; the
reduction of numerous processing operations into an instantaneous
transfer; the fact that the controls against theft are themselves susceptible to re-programming at the behest of the thief; the weakness of
psychological and social inhibitions against "computer rape"; the inadequacy of -typical computer security measures; and the delays in
discovery of computer thefts.2 6
Existing safeguards against computer thefts are clearly ineffective. One student of computer crime notes:
Donn Parker, after looking into the recorded cases of computer
crime, concluded that hardly any were discovered through normal
security precautions or accounting controls and that nearly all of
them were uncovered by happenstance. Some experts estimate
that the ratio of undiscovered to discovered crimes may be on the
order of 100 to 1.27
He goes on to note the conclusion of RAND and other students of
computer crime that "no major defense system has withstood a dedicated attack."22 The Equity Funding imbroglio stands as eloquent
witness to this proposition. In the halcyon day when the nation's
banks are finally linked together in an integrated EFT network, the
computer crimes of the past may well be recalled with nostalgia as
quaint petty larcenies.
But criminal intent is not -the only source of concern to consumers
in a world of EFT systems. Human incompetence or error, once
computerized, may be as difficult to detect and correct as computer
crime is to solve. And errors there will surely be. One need only
reflect on the Apollo tragedy to appreciate the vulnerability of complex interdependent systems to error, even under the best of conditions.
By the same token, one need only reflect upon one's own experience
with computerized billing to appreciate how incorrigible such systems
can become.2 9 Consumers confronted with a choice between having to
persuade a banker that an error has been made and having to get a
computer re-programmed may well prefer the former.
26. For a recent discussion of computer theft, see Porter, Computer Raped by
Telephone, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1974 (Magazine), at 33.
27. Id. at 34.
28. Id. at 43.
29. In the recent Virginia Study, seventy-seven percent of the consumers surveyed agreed that the more complicated a billing system is, the harder it is to get
mistakes fixed. Fifty-nine percent disagreed with the statement that billing systems
handled by computer are usually free from error. Virginia Study, supra note 8, at 39.
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Privacy - The data on the susceptibility of computerized systems to
criminal intrusions suggests another risk -that seems to inhere in
EFT - breaches of privacy. As the American Civil Liberties Union
has pointed out, EFT will render a person's entire financial history,
including the most intimate details, available "at the touch of a button."3 The Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc., agrees that this capability now exists. 8' The findings of a recent
GAO study showing the extent to which government agencies have
disseminated personal information in their files to credit bureaus and
other third parties indicates that such concerns are well-founded. 2
And as the Watergate disclosures remind us, political incentives are
as capable as economic ones of generating such intrusions. In contrast, the existing transfer system, though arguably inefficient in the
narrow economic sense, is more difficult to abuse; the valued information is dispersed rather than being stored in one central location.
Reduced Competition - EFT raises a number of troublesome issues
revolving around the question of competition in the banking industry.
Governor Mitchell has identified one such issue - "whether paperless technology can make competing clearing systems economically
feasible."'33 If the question is put another way - are the initial costs
of EFT so great that the system can only be established if all or nearly
all banks participate - the implications of this question for consumers
become clearer. The comments on Regulation J submitted to the
Federal Reserve Board by numerous banks, savings and loans, and
credit unions indicate a widespread conviction that only the relatively
large institutions can afford the equipment and software costs of an
EFT system going beyond pre-arranged in-bank transfers and perhaps direct pay deposit. Whether these assertions are correct or are
merely the cries of institutions unwilling to compete, remains to be
seen. On the other hand, it appears that an advanced EFT system
is economically viable only if a substantial proportion of the banking
industry participates. In view of the apparent lack of consumer demand
for EFT, the "critical mass" of institutions required in order to make
EFT profitable may be unattainable in the absence of public subsidies
30. Comments of Robert E. Smith on Regulation J. (on file at the Federal
Reserve Board).
31. Comments on Regulation J. (on file at the Federal Reserve Board).
32. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON
POSSIBLE

IMPROVEMENTS

IN

ARMY

PRACTICES
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PROTECTING
PROBLEMS

INFORMATION
IN

PER-

CORRECTING PER-

August 5, 1974 (P-74-FPCD-101).
33. Address by George W. Mitchell, Money Payments in Perspective, Conference of the Charge Account Bankers Division, American Bankers Association, September 25, 1973, at 8 [hereinafter cited as Mitchell Sept. 1973 Address].
SONNEL INFORMATION,
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or governmental coercion in the form of regulatory standards. If
history is any guide, either of these strategies will tend to reduce competition in the industry by forcing the smaller firms out of business
and/or by immunizing firms from the discipline of market forces.3,4
In addition, an advanced EFT system will require joint cooperative arrangements on a long-term basis between large numbers of
banking institutions. Observing that competition probably cannot be
counted on "to play much of a disciplining role when transfer arrangements involve associations of banks," Governor Mitchell has concluded
that continued Federal Reserve regulation of check clearing will therefore be required.a5
Even in the absence of public subsidies, an advanced EFT system
is likely to involve significant cross-subsidies among consumers. The
suit filed in 1974 by Consumer Union against American Express
Company involved the question of whether cash customers should be
required to pay for credit card services which they do not enjoy.
Similarly, a mature EFT system will mesh together into one system
a number of banking services (credit, third party transfers, savings,
cash) which are not purchased separately by, and provided separately
to, the consumer. This "bundling" of services may be exceedingly
difficult or expensive to "unbundle" for purposes of pricing; if so,
many consumers will end up paying for more services than they want
or use, while others will use more than they pay for.
If consumer sovereignty is to be a reality in EFT, it is imperative that an EFT network ensure that consumers, merchants,
and businesses retain the freedom, as both a legal and practical matter,
to hold accounts in whatever institutions they wish, and that those
who wish to avoid use of EFT altogether be free to do so, so long as
they are willing to pay the costs.
These principles have several corollaries. First, public policies
which have the effect of coercing institutions to participate in EFT
must be resisted, even if the result is that EFT cannot achieve the
critical mass for its viability.36 Secondly, the commercial banks cannot be permitted to exclude savings and loans and other thrift institutions from full participation in EFT."7 Thomas R. Bomar, Chair34. If this is true, it does not necessarily mean that such regulation would not, on
balance, be socially desirable.
35. Mitchell Sept. 1973 Address, sutpra note 33, at 8.
36. It is entirely possible that the market, if left undisturbed, will yield both an
EFT system that is too limited to be economically feasible and a conventional paper
transfer system whose unit costs will increase due to a loss in volume resulting from
exploitation of EFT by large institutions.
37. The arguments in favor of such exclusion, relating to the differing regulatory requirements applicable to commercial banks and the thrifts are themselves only
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man of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, has noted one dramatic
anti-competitive consequence of such an exclusion:
It is well known that thrift institutions compete with commercial banks for savings. This competitive environment in the
past has been enhanced by the fact that the employee, with paycheck in hand, can make the choice of where he will deposit his
funds. Many presently choose to deposit all or a portion of their
pay in savings and loan associations. Current information indicates that between 5 and 15 percent of savings deposits in savings
and loans come from payroll checks carried or mailed by employees to savings and loan associations. Because only commercial banks are presently allowed to be designated as depositories in these new electronic systems, and since employers who
decide to use the system can be expected to encourage their employees to participate, the opportunity for an employee to choose
a savings and loan as his depository is effectively eliminated.
[S]avings and loan associations have thus far been systematically excluded from membership for the purpose of receiving
[Automated Clearing House] deposits directly."8
And how, one wonders, will the forty percent of the population
who do not now have checking accounts fare in a world of EFT systems ? Will more businesses refuse to accept cash, as some car rental
agencies now do, insisting that customers participate in EFT in order
to do business with them? Will participants in an EFT system, motivated by a desire to reduce their costs and/or maximize their cash
flow, be able to use economic leverage to force non-participants into
the system? These issues must be resolved before consumers can be
certain that EFT systems will function in their economic interests.
Having pointed out some of the anti-competitive risks which
EFTS could entail, it is also important to recognize that EFTS
possess the potential to dramatically enhance competition in banking and consumer finance markets. Certainly, EFTS can obliterate
plausible in the context of the over-regulated, anti-competitive system now in place.
If the recommendations of the Hunt Commission are adopted and extended, any
rationale for exclusion of thrifts from EFT systems will vanish. See generally THE
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE & REGULATION (1971).
38. Hearings on H.R. 11221 Before the Subcomm. on Bank Supervision and
Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19
(1973). See also comments of Donald I. Baker of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, id. at 155-63.
39. The Virginia Study found that such persons, usually in lower economic
brackets, gain "the emotional satisfaction of actually feeling and handling cash . . .
and [are] unlikely to respond favorably to" an EFT system. Virginia Study, supra
note 8, at 39-40.
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many geographical restraints on competition and will probably hasten
the repeal of state branching restrictions, which the Supreme Court
has recently described as "a simple device to protect outlying unit
banks from the rigors of regional competition." 4
CONCLUSION

Recalling once again that each consumer will balance these benefits
and costs associated with EFT differently, and that EFT covers a wide
variety of system types, it is nevertheless difficult to escape the following conclusion: on balance and given the existing set of incentives
confronting them, most consumers will not willingly opt for EFT.
That being so, it seems likely that EFT will either have to be forced
upon them or will remain under-developed, at least until the costs
of the existing transfer system press heavily upon consumers and
until ways are found to overcome some of the more undesirable features
of EFT.
Incentives to consumers could be rationalized considerably if the
full costs of checking services were imposed on consumers, instead
of being hidden in other bank charges. "Free" checking accounts,
like "free" lunches, are a figment of the bank marketing executive's
imagination. The process of "unbundling" banking services and
pricing them at full cost would be vastly accelerated if banks could
pay interest on demand deposits, thus encouraging them to impose
service charges on check usage. This would undoubtedly reduce the
flow of paper through the system."
As noted above, some of the deficiencies of EFTS can probably
be cured without great difficulty. For example, providing a stoppayment period, as the California SCOPE project has done, and
furnishing proof of payment should be well within the capabilities of
EFTS. Other obstacles, however, will remain formidable and perhaps
insurmountable. The risks of computer crime, surveillance and the
problem of diminished control over finances, for example, seem to be
firmly associated with EFTS. These problems will simply have to be
confronted and solved if consumers are to reap the benefits which EFTS
promise.
40. United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 95 S. Ct. 2099, 2117-18 n.30
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41. See Eisenmenger, Munnell & Weiss, Pricing and the Role of the Federal
Reserve in an Electronic Funds Transfer System, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
BOSTON,
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